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The Product Mix:
Composition, Quality, and Variety
As WE shall measure it, economic growth means expansion in the capacity
to produce things, and this cannot be fully revealed in figures. If produced
things did not change in nature, there would be only the technical problem
of measuring quantities; but growth and change go hand in hand, and
the gray area of "qualitative change" cannot be captured in quantitative
form.
We are interested in the qualitative changes resulting from greater or
lesser productive activity with a given technology. For our purposes, the
quality of an item may be taken as improved when more resources are
used to produce it, and worsened when fewer are used.' The term is,
therefore, being used in a very restricted sense, since in ordinary usage it
also refers to such things as change in the efficiency with which something
is produced, or in its value in use.
Soviet attitudes on production differ from those in the West, and for
this reason the pattern of qualitative change has been different.In the
background lie two basic factors.First, Soviet industry has been split in
two, one sector—heavy and military industry—being systematically
favored over the rest.Second, the economic system has an inherent
quantitative bias, traceable in part to the working of the system itself
and in part to the crusading nature of communism.
These forces work both for and against each other, and the result is
mixed as far as the qualitative aspects of growth are concerned. Alec
Nove is justified in warning us against sweeping conclusions based on the
volume and sharpness of internal complaints about the quality of goods;2
It is generally assumed that poor quality is a characteristic of Soviet
production. This assertion has some truth in it, but needs to be care-
fully qualified. There is evidence that Soviet industry is capable of
first-class precision workmanship, and also plenty of evidence to the
contrary: of bathroom taps which do not run and textile dyes that do.
1Improvedquality does not, of course, always result from additional expenditure of
resources. With inefficiency not difficult to imagine, a leaky fountain pen could be more
costly than a lcakproof one. We must suppose that the optimum available technology
is, or would be, used in every case being compared.
2A.Nove, "The Pace of Soviet Economic Development," Lloyds Bank Review, April
1956, pp. 11 if.
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One should beware of concluding that poor quality is an inherently
"Soviet" characteristic.It would be wiser to bear in mind that these
things are, at least in part, consequences of the sheer pace of Russia's
industrial revolution. An industry staffed by half-trained ex-peasants
is apt to produce a high proportion of spoiled work, under communism,
fascism, feudalism or any other system known to man. With the
passage of time, Russia has acquired a fairly large skilled-labour force,
but there has not been enough of it to go around, and priority has been
given to heavy industry. This, and the inevitable effect of a constant
seller's market, has certainly tended to depress the quality of consumers'
goods and the standard (as well as the rate) of house building. Even
so, this state of affairs cannot be assumed to last indefinitely, and the
visitor who finds (as the author of these lines did) that door handles
come off in hotels should not conclude that Soviet industry produces
defective railway locomotives or machine tools.Door handles have
no priority.
It is important not to be misled by the large number of criticisms of
defects which appear often enough in the Soviet press.It is easy to
catalogue these criticisms and derive from them a picture comforting for
the complacent but fundamentally inaccurate. The system as a whole
is not chaotic, even though examples of chaos can be properly cited; it
does work. The essential fact is that the U.S.S.R. is a vast country
of contrasts, which has developed very unevenly, with the good and the
bad existing still side by side. One should also remember that ineffi-
ciencies in Western countries would be better known if the private
affairs of firms were liable to be released to the press. In the U.S.S.R.,
the authorities use publicity in a carefully selective way. Hence an out-
burst of criticism directed at some sector is not necessarily proof that it
is peculiarly defective, or that its efficiency has declined; the reason may
be a decision to launch a campaign to improve it, or possibly even a
desire to discredit the minister in charge.
Most of what Nove says should be heeded, but his warning is in a sense
too strong. Whatever might be true for the future, Soviet industry in the
past has been the model of austerity, and this is relevant in studying its
growth.In the emphasis on quantitative growth, the simple has been
generally favored over the complex and amount over quality. The result
has been an economy with products less varied than in the West, with a
product mix more heavily weighted in favor of producer and military
goods, and with a quality of goods generally lower.
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Many Soviet products in areas like heavy industry and the military
sector now equal or excel Western products, demonstrating rapid progress
in these fields. But there has not been the across-the-board improvement
that has characterized Western industrial growth. The most marked
improvements have been in metallurgy, machinery, and munitions; other-
wise, growth has been primarily quantitative, consisting in expanded
output of standardized commodities.
A.n anecdote of the second world war3 portrays this contrast. During an
air raid a Western ambassador and his military attaché watched a Soviet
anti-aircraft battery manned by young women who maintained a rapid
rate of fire on attacking aircraft. The attaché, an artillery officer, was
fascinated by the Soviet guns and the efficient way they were being handled.
After the raid was over, he took out his pipe for a smoke and broke a
dozen matches before getting one to light.Pointing to the matches and
the guns, he burst out: "How can people who make and work guns like
that make matches like this ?"
Thiscontrast needs to be understood, especially in relation to other
Soviet developments. We shall see how it conditions responses to stresses
in the economic system bringing about unevenly distributed swings in the
quality of production. We shall then turn to qualitative trends over the
long run, and conclude with a discussion of the product mix in different
segments of industry.
Qualitative Changes in the Short Run
The first period of stress faced by the Soviet economy came in the decade
following the revolution.Civil war and internal disorder had caused
industrial production to fall to around a fifth of its prerevolutionary level
by 1920. Although a large segment of industry had already passed over
to state ownership, the shaping of a new economic order was to take place
while industry was recovering in the period of the New Economic Policy
(1921—1928). One characteristic of this formative period was a deteriora-
tion in the quality of industrial goods.
This problem was evident at the launching of the five year plans, being
widely commented upon by Soviet officials as well as foreign observers.
We find William Henry Chamberlin writing as follows in 1929
There is probably no method of measuring quality as precisely and
definitely as one may ascertain quantity in industrial production. But
Related to me by Professor John H. Young.
W. H. Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, Boston, 1930, pp. 155 if.
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it is the unanimous testimony of Russian consumers, a testimony which
is not contradicted, even by Soviet economic officials and experts with
whom I have talked, that the quality of Russian products, especially of
wearing apparel and many other articles of immediate consumption,
has not reached the pre-war level.Several years ago Leon Trotzky
initiated the idea of a commission which should hear complaints
regarding the quality of industrial production;its offices were soon
flooded with boots that leaked after the first trial, knives that failed to
cut, textiles that tore after a short period of wear, etc. Krzhizhanovsky,
President of the State Planning Commission, admits that "the quan-
titative needs of production often compel us to ignore quality."(Basic
Problems of the Control Figures for 1928—1929, p.9.)And here is an
excerpt from The Conjuncture oflndustryfor 1927—1928 (p. 38), a book
published under the auspices of the Supreme Economic Council,
regarding the quality of production during this period :—
"Duringthe year there were complaints regarding deterioration of
quality from the metallurgical industry, because of the increased number
of cinders from the coal, and from the railroads, because of the increased
quantity of damaged goods in some products of the metallurgical
industry. There were also complaints regarding the deterioration of the
quality of overshoes, shoes, building material, aniline dyes, some forms
of agricultural machinery, etc."
In a report of its findings on consumer goods, the commission referred
to by Chamberlin stated, among other things, that galoshes wore only
half as long as in 1913, that textiles had similarly depreciated, and that
shoes had gotten even worse. In four factories producing cotton textiles,
45 to 63 per cent of gray goods and 24 to 50 per cent of finished goods
classified as "standard quality" were found to be defective, or brak in the
Soviet terminology.The shoes produced in five factories were all
characterized by the commission as brak. Boxes of matches were found to
be 15 per cent short in count, and packages of cigarettes and cheap
tobacco (makhorka) 20 per cent short in weight.5
Conditions in this period are tersely summarized by Professor Calvin
Hoover, who wrote in 1931 that "there can be no argument about the
miserably poor quality of product of Soviet industry up to the present
time. This poor quality is constantly criticized by the Soviet press, and
there is an earnest desire to improve it.But partly on account of the
I. Z. Kachanov, "0 kachestvc potrebitel'skikh tovarov" [The Quality of Consumer
Goods], Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie [Economic Survey], 1929, No. 10, pp. 23, 31, 33, and 39.
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necessity for increasing the quantity of production, and partly on account
of the shortage of raw material, execrable quality continues to characterize
Soviet manufactures."6
These conditions persisted and perhaps worsened through the First
Five Year Plan, when pressure mounted for accelerated growth. Accord-
ing to Elisha Friedman, "not only was the Plan unrealized with respect to
quantity, but far more so with respect to quality of workmanship. This
was true not only of finished goods but even of some semi-finished products
and raw materials such as coal, coke, ores, and metals."7 He cites the
following examples of poor quality criticized in the Soviet press: raw
steel, strip copper, tungsten acid, molybdate of ammonium, calcium car-
bide, cast-iron taps, insulated electrical wiring, steel castings, copper and
bronze fittings, tractors and their component parts, electric light bulbs,
footwear, textiles, clothing, glassware, and calculating machines.8 He
says of the tractors
Because the raw material was poor the finished tractors could not
stand up under use. A machine tractor station in Azerbaidzhan
received thirty-two tractors from the Stalingrad plant. When they
were assembled many defects were revealed. Their rims did not fit; the
radiator pipes of thirty tractors leaked at two to seven places. Other
difficulties too numerous to mention were found.After running in
neutral for a short time the tractors began to backfire because the
porcelain of the sparkplugs burst.Similarly the tractors of the Red
Putilovetz plant proved inferior in quality. Of a shipment of thirty sent
to the Volokolam tractor station one was sent back within four days for
an overhauling, and eleven others which could not even start to work
were left out in the fields. But the loss from tractors which failed com-
pletely was less than from the others which must be stopped every two or
three hours for repairs.These criticisms were not confined to the
tractor stations.From all over the Soviet Union came sworn com-
plaints of difficulties, such as leaking radiators, poorly cast cylinder
heads, loose bearings, broken valve springs, unsatisfactory threading
on sparkplugs, etc.
As planning became more realistic and the industrial base expanded,
the pressures undermining quality also lessened. There seems to have been
6C.B. Hoover, The Economic LffeqfSoviet Russia, New York, 1931, p. 46.
E. M. Friedman, Russia in Transition, London, 1933, p. 120.
8Ibid.,pp. 120 and 282 if.
Ibid., pp.283if.
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a general improvement in quality of goods during the Second Five Year
Plan, except in certain areas of consumer goods. An article on textiles
appearing in a Soviet trade journal in 1936 states that "only a complete
lack of attention to technological processes, a race for quantity, a lack of
proper interest in the quality of production, and the existence of regula-
tions that cover up the production of substandard goods have created this
vicious circle that has led to a deterioration in the quality of the textiles on
the market."°
Developments from 1937 to recent years are shrouded in secrecy. The
political purges, the mounting military preparedness program, and the
retarding industrial growth probably led to a general worsening in quality
of production during the short-lived. Third Five Year Plan, but the details
cannot be known. The growing problem of quality control would seem to
be reflected in the issuance by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
ukase of July 10, 1940, stating that "the output of defective or incomplete
products that do not meet compulsory standards is a crime against the
state equivalent to wrecking," and setting punishments for this crime at
five to eight years imprisonment.1'
Like most economic details, the problem of quality was not commented
on widely in the Soviet press during the decade following World War II,
but it received increasing attention toward the end of the Fifth Five Year
Plan, particularly after Premier Bulganin's report ofJuly 1955 on problems
of industrial development.'2 In setting the tone for succeeding discussion,
he stated: "It is necessary that those who neglect the quality of production,
and thus crudely trample underfoot the interests of the state and the
population, be severely punished. Party organizations are called upon to
play a great role in the struggle for the quality of production."His
references to poor quality included consumer goods, fuels, metallurgy, and
machine building.13
Bulganin singled out the difficulties in meeting "assortment plans":14
10P.Fadeev and D. Zamkovskii, "0 kachestve standartov tekstil'nykh tovarov" [On the
Worth of the Standards for Textiles], Voprosy sovetskoi torgouli [Problems of Soviet Trade],
1936, No. 10, P. 40. To qualify as bra/c, a cotton fabric had to have more than eight
holes and seventeen spots or stains in a bolt of thirty-five to forty meters; a woolen fabric,
more than 120 holes and 240 spots or stains (see ibid., p. 37).
Voprosy sovetskoi torgovli, 1940, No. 8, p. 3.
12N.A. Bulganin, "Concerning Tasks in the Further Advance of Industry, Technical
Progress and Improvement of Production Organization" (a speech at the Plenary Session
of Communist Party Central Committee, July 4, 1955), Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
VII, 28, pp. 3—20 and 24 (original text in Pravda and Izvestia, July 17, 1955). Hence-




A serious defect in the work of industry is the mistaken practice,
which is most harmful to the national economy and which we have not
outlived, of the nonfulfillment of the production plan in terms of
category quotas.
For example, although the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy over-
fulfilled the 1954 plan for rolled metal production as a whole by 173,000
tons, it failed to produce 155,000 tons of special large and small rolled
steel sections, which are in short supply, 85,000 tons of rolled wire and
25,000 tons of rolled wheels.
Several branches of machine building also do not fulfill the plan for
the established categories of goods.
The Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, which overfulfilled the
over-all production plan for 1954, failed to fulfill the plan for the
production of metallurgical equipment, forging and pressing machines,
various types of lifting and transport equipment, diesel engines, and gas
generator motors. The Ministry of Machine Tools overfulfihled the plan
for 1954 for the total quantity of metal-cutting lathes and forging and
pressing machines. However, it has not fulfilled the plan for production
of the more important types of heavy machine tools and forging and
pressing equipment.
The Ministry of Electrical Equipment overfulfilled last year's over-all
production plan. However, the tasks of production of such important
types of goods, essential for the national economy, as electric motors
exceeding 100 kilowatts, power transformers and generators for steam
and hydraulic turbines have been considerably underfulfilled by the
ministry.
One can find many similar examples in other fields of industry.
The volume of criticism grew around the end of 1956 and early in 1957,
following a year in which difficulties had been encountered in meeting the
goals of the new Sixth Five Year Plan, leading finally to abandonment of
the plan in the fall of 1957.It may be useful to quote from articles
appearing at that time to illustrate that the tendency for quality to
deteriorate in times of stress has carried over to recent years.
An editorial, "Constant Attention to Quality of Output," appearing in
Pravda on December 7, 1956, focused attention on deteriorating quality.
It says in part:'5
Losses from unacceptable production have risen rather than fallen,
Current Digest, VIII, 49, p. 24. For more complaints about agricultural equipment,
see ibid., p. 26; ibid., IX, 5, p. 27; and ibid., X, 3, pp. 26 f.
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and the output of goods of poor quality continues. The quality of the
output of a number of tractor and farm machine plants is not good. In
the first nine months of 1956 the Ministry of Agriculture's receiving
agents were compelled to reject and return to factory assembly shops
more than 15 per cent of the machinery intended for shipment to
Machine and Tractor Stations and collective farms. The number of
defective tractors coming off the lines of the Kharkov and Vladimir
Plants has been greater than in 1955. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant has
been guilty of especially grave violations of the technical conditions for
manufacturing and assembling machines.This enterprise's officials
have not organized a struggle against defective output in the machine
shops, and as a result many defective parts reach the assembly shops.
This has resulted in the rejection as defective of 28 per cent of the DT-54
tractors turned out in the first nine months of 1956. Many machines are
being rejected as defective at other plants of the Ministry of Tractor and
Farm Machine Building..
Losses from faulty output in Gorky's plants and factories in the first
nine months of 1956 amounted to. .. twiceas much as the city's enter-
prises saved in the same period by lowering the cost of production.
A group of machine builders writes Pravda that "after spending
1,089 hours machining one part of a surface grinder it had to be melted
down again because there were blisters in the castings received from the
Vulcan Plant. Many other castings received from this plant also had to
be rejected as defective. The Forward Plant delivers castings of even
poorer quality.Since the beginning of 1956 our plant has returned
about 100 tons of castings to the suppliers as completely useless.".
Several weeks later deficiencies were pointed out in production and
distribution of spare parts for agricultural machinery. Among other
things, it was said that "machinery repairs are being seriously held up by
the incomplete assortment [of spare parts]—a lack of such parts as, for
instance, drive shafts, piston rings for starting motors, and some others";
that "MTS often receive unsuitable, defective spare parts, made in
violation of the technical norms"; and that "parts are still supplied 'in
bulk' with the result that MTS receive pistons of one size and piston
sleeves of another."16 A later letter complains about the difficulty of
getting tires and tubes.17
16Ibid.,IX, 2, p. 30 (original text of an editorial, "Important Task of Personnel in
Industry," in Pravda, January 11, 1957).
17CurrentDigest, IX, 14, p. 33 (original text of letter from two collective farm chairmen
in Pravda, April 6, 1957).
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Products of ferrous metallurgy and furniture making were also criticized.
In the former case, difficulties in meeting plan goals were said to stem in
part from the fact that "the steel mills are developing faster than the iron
ore industry. The iron content of ore is declining constantly, even though
the need for raw material is growing. Many blast furnaces continue to
work with damp ore, and their productivity is therefore iow."8 In the
case of furniture, the Deputy Minister of Trade is quoted as saying that the
products of one factory "not only were poorly made but actually smelled
of fish oil." The article says that "sometimes, because the trade personnel
are not sufficiently demanding, poor furniture still manages to make its way
into the stores."It is said of upholstery cloth that "the fabrics are light
in weight, narrow in width and impractical, and their colors are poor."9
The quality of leather footwear was appraised in a letter to Pravda from
a local shoemaker published January 9, 1957, which reads in part as
follows :20
Everyyear our industry turns out more footwear.It fulfills the plan
as far as quantity goes; however, the quality of the footwear remains
low. Every day my work as a shoemaker convinces me of this.
The following factories turn out poor quality footwear: the Kagano-
vich Plant in Minsk, the Severokhod Plant in Yaroslavl, the Paris
Commune Plant in Moscow, and plants in Orel, Shakhty, Yerevan,
Tbilisi and many other cities. Very often the products of these plants
have to be repaired two or three weeks after they are bought.
Why do shoes wear out so fast? The trouble is that the glue and
waxed thread do not hold the soles. The composition inner sole comes
off and sticks to the socks, and after a month and a half the leather sole
comes off, along with the welt; the nails and the iron and copper screws
turn inward and prick the feet;the poor-quality counter lining soon
tears and the counter chafes the feet. The tops of the shoes produced at
the Shakhty and Tbilisi Plants are especially bad.
Against this volume of complaints about quality in very recent years, we
18CurrentDigest, VIII, 50, p. 30 (original text of an article, "Overcome Lag of Ferrous
Metallurgy in Dnieper Area," in Pravda, December 10, 1956).
19CurrentDigest, VIII, 50, p. 33 (original text of an article, "About Comfortable and
Beautiful' Furniture," in Izvestia, December 15, 1956).See also Current Digest, IX, 26,
p. 16; ibid., IX, 38, p. 24; and ibid., IX, 40, p. 24.
20Ibid.,IX, 2, p. 31.See ibid., IX, 8, p. 47, for a reply from three officials of a shoe
factory published in Pravda, February 26, 1957, While admitting the poor quality of
footwear; these officials place the blame on inadequate raw materials. See also a letter on
children's shoes in Current Digest, IX, 26, p. 32 (original text in Izvestia, June 29, 1957).
On other items of clothing, see Current Digest, IX, 35, p. 25, and ibid., IX, 45, p. 29.
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must place the accumulating evidence of a trend toward improvement in
the quality of consumer goods since the death of Stalin. We see this
reflected in eyewitness accounts of qualified observers who have visited the
Soviet Union at different times separated by passage of years, in the post-
war as well as the interwar period.2' We may infer the same thing from
the increasing diversion of resources to consumer goods:from 1950
through 1955, output of consumer goods apparently grew more rapidly
than total industrial output (see Table 59).
In drawing a moral from the instances of quality deterioration described
in the Soviet press, we must therefore bear in mind the warnings of Nove
and not conclude too much. The focusing of criticism on particular
industries—as agricultural machinery, textiles, footwear, furniture—may
represent special campaigns to bring about improvements. At the same
time this does not explain the bunching of complaints, spread over a wide
area of products, that seems to occur when industry is having difficulty
fulfilling the quantitative tasks set for it.In times of stress, quality tends,
in response to the pressures described in the preceding chapter, to
depreciate as the growth rate slows down, making the quantitative record
look better than it is.These temporary deteriorations in quality get con-
centrated in areas of lower priority—particularly consumer goods—but
they may spill over into more favored areas if the stress is great enough,
as it apparently was in the early Soviet period and during the short-lived
Sixth Five Year Plan.Whether such "cyclical" worsening of quality
persists over the long run is another story, to which we now turn.
Qualitative Changes in the Long Run22
Trends in quality also reflect the basic contrast in priorities. In the favored
sectors of industry—primarily within the three metallurgy,
21See,e.g., the articles by Elizabeth Swayne in Printer's Ink, August 14 and 21, 1959
and Profit Parade, July and August, 1959.
22Thediscussion in this section and the following one is based largely on data in the
tables and notes of Statistical Abstract of industrial Output in the Soviet Union, 1913—1955,
New York, NBER, 1956.Citations will be made only when other sources are used.
Our knowledge of technical conditions has been greatly improved as a result of recent
visits to the Soviet Union by U.S. industrial delegations under the cultural exchange
programs. Some of the reports that have been issued are:"Russian Metallurgy,"
Journal of Metals, March 1958; Report on Visit of U.S.A. Plastics Industry Exchange Delegation
to USSR, June 2 to June 28, 1958 (Society of the Plastics Industry), New York, n.d.;
William E. Vannah, "A Team Reports on Control Inside Russia," Control Engineering,
November 1958; Steel in the Soviet Union (American Iron and Steel Institute), New York,
1959; A Report on the Visit of an American Delegation to Observe Concrete and Prestressed Concrete
Engineering in the USSR (Portland Cement Association), Chicago, 1959; A Report on
USSR Electric Power Developments, 1958/59 (Edison Electric Institute), New York, 1960;
and "Soviet Computing Technology—1959," Transactions (Institute of Radio Engineers),
March 1960, and Communications (Association for Computing Machinery), March 1960.
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machinery, and munitions—rapid growth in output has been accompanied
by substantial improvement in quality; in the neglected sectors—primarily
within the three "C's": consumer goods, construction materials, and
chemicals—quality has improved slowly and, in some cases,even
depreciated.
Let us recall that, for our purposes, quality is being measured by
costliness under the ruling technology and not by usefulness in some other
sense. Similarly, we are not concerned at this point with the elements of
economic growth that fall customarily under the heading of technological
improvements. We are simply trying to isolate those "physical" dimen-
sions of growth in a product that are not captured in the available measures
of physical output.Since the item given in statistics as a "product" is
usually a mixture of products narrowly defined, qualitative change will
involve change in the product mix as well as in the nature of individual
products within the mix.
By its very nature, analysis of qualitative change must be descriptive;
the results cannot be put in figures, though much of the pertinent evidence
may be presented that way. In any case, most of the evidence comes from
Soviet sources, and this poses certain problems.As we noted in the
preceding chapter, performance in some sectors of industry is shielded
from view, and this applies to changes in quality as well as in output. On
the one hand, these sectors include declining or very slow-growing
industries, where quality is also probably improving very slowly or not at
all—possibly even worsening. On the other hand, they also include
industries closely related to military production, where, by all visible
signs, quality has improved in pace with output.
Again as we have already noted, criticisms of specific industries appear-
ing in the Soviet press may at times be more directly related to campaigns
for reform than to worsening conditions. One must be careful to go
beyond these sporadic outbursts before drawing conclusions about long-
run developments. But this is made difficult by the fact that the qualitative
aspects of growth have not been systematically discussed in the Soviet
technical literature. The picture of historical changes in quality within a
particular industry must be pieced together from widely scattered frag-
ments of information.
Any discussion of qualitative changes, no matter how extensive it may
appear to be, is bound to be annoyingly incomplete. Moreover, too much
remains unseen to know how representative the fragmentary description
actually is. With this repeated warning, we proceed to say what can be
said.
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EXAMPLES OF IMPROVING QUALITY
The world has witnessed the rapid Soviet progress in the three "M's" and
little more need or can be said here. Metals such as steel, aluminum, and
tin have been entering increasingly into world trade and have Lompeted
successfully with the products of other countries. According to first-hand
reports of qualified Western observers, the postwar Soviet iron and steel
industry—except possibly for rolling mills—is technically on a comparable
footing with the British and American though the products
are of somewhat lower quality.24
Soviet machinery and equipment, though often copied from Western
prototypes and produced on a more standardized basis, have apparently
kept pace with technological developments in special areas.This is
certainly true of military weapons and equipment, in novel as well as
conventional lines, as we know from the fact that fission and fusion bombs
have been exploded, powerful rockets launched, satellites orbited, and so
on. In warfare itself, the world has observed the high quality of tanks,
aircraft, artillery pieces, and rockets. Unfortunately, these "eyewitness"
observations cannot be fortified by systematic evidence from open source
materials, but there would seem to be no reason to question the Soviet
advances in these fields, as far as quality of production is concerned.
Industrial products connected with other favoredactivities,like
education and science, have also probably shown marked improvement
over the Soviet period, though extensive documentation is again lacking.
Even within the more neglected sector of consumer goods, there has been
improvement in durable goods, at least in the sense that new products
have been introduced:television, long-playing records, aluminum pots
and pans, cameras, watches, and so on. As an example regarding con-
sumer perishables, higher-grade tobaccos have displaced the traditional
low-grade makhorka absolutely as well as relatively.
In another relatively neglected area, construction materials, there has
been a notable improvement in the quality of portland cement—though
incidents such as the powdery floors at the recent U.S. exposition in
Moscow suggest that there is room for further advance.Output has
grown more rapidly for the better grades than for the poorer ones, so that
the aggregate output weighted by 1937 Soviet prices rose by 25 per cent
more over 1928—37 than aggregate output in simple tonnage.In the
28Steelin the Soviet Union; Economist, December 3, 1955, pp. 863 if;The Russian Iron
and Steel Industry, Special Report No. 57, London, Iron and Steel Institute, 1956; and
"The Russian Steel Industry," Steel Review, April 1956, pp. 24—48.
24 Steelin the Soviet Union, pp. 191 and 247.
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case of roofing materials, asbestos shingles have been replacing roofing
paper, the share of the former in output measured in square meters
rising from 11 per cent in 1913 to 24 per cent in 1928 and to 32 per cent
in 1955.At the same time, roofing iron has declined in importance,
offsetting to some extent the shift to asbestos shingles. By 1940, the last
year for which data are available, the output of roofing iron had fallen to
a quarter of its level in 1913.
These random notes cover only a portion of the cases that might be
cited. The imprecise and incomplete nature of the discussion illustrates
the handicap an outsider labors under in trying to assess a region of
activity shrouded in secrecy. This handicap is further highlighted by the
importance attached to travelers' tales—Marco Polo economics—as a
source of information on these qualitative matters. We do not yet know
enough about the products of Soviet industryto make anything
approaching a definitive appraisal of trends in quality.
EXAMPLES OF UNCHANGING OR WORSENING QUALITY
There are a number of industries in which quality of product has failed
to improve or has worsened. In part, this has been the kind of develop-
ment always observed in the early stages of industrialization, as machines
replace handicrafts and standardized production begins to serve mass
markets. The very word "brummagem," from Birmingham, has been
adopted into the English language to stand for shoddy, standardized
merchandise.Beyond this,itis characteristic of a centrally directed
economic order for the product mix to be simplified and for variety to be
de-emphasized in favor of standardized goods.Centralized planning
becomes less and less efficient as the number of products multiplies.
And, as products are simplified and standardized, some downgrading
inevitably occurs. We may observe this in such things as the develop-
ment of compulsory public education and the governmental postal mono-
poly in the United States.
But there is also something unique in the Soviet case, as we have
emphasized several times: a stress on quantitative performance combined
with the favoring of some industrial sectors over others.For industries
of high priority the "quantitative bias" may be overshadowed by the
obvious gains in quality, as in military weapons and machinery. As one
moves down the list of priorities, qualitative improvements are likely to
become increasingly secondary until the point is reached at which
quality suffers absolutely in favor of quantity. The sacrifice of quality is
most pronounced in sectors neglected for reasons of both internal and
64COMPOSITION, QUALITY, AND VARIETY
external policy. These sectors are starved of the more efficient productive
techniques and treated as residual claimants for resources.25
Coal is an example of a product with relatively high priority—at least
until very recently—that has experienced a rather steady deterioration of
quality. The sulfur and ash content has been rising, while the calorific
content has been falling. Ash content rose gradually from 15.2 per cent
in 1940 to 18.6 per cent in 1957.26 An index of calorific content per ton
of coal runs as follows:27
1913 100 1940 94
1928 98 1945 85
1932 97 1950 87
1937 95 1955 88
The decline is attributable in large measure to the increasing share of
output accounted for by lignite, one of the cheapest forms of coal. Lignite
accounted for 4 per cent of output in 1913, 9 per cent in 1928, 8 per cent
in 1932, 14 per cent in 1937, and 29 per cent in 1950 and 1955.
There has also been some loss in the quality of Soviet crude petroleum
as output has declined in relative importance in the Caucasian fields and
risen in the Ural-Volga fields. The sulfur content (which affects actual
25Wehave a recent example of "quantitative bias" with rather far-reaching conse-
quences in the Soviet-type industrialization of Hungary and Poland, which may have
some relevance to earlier developments in the Soviet Union as well. The conditions in
Hungary are documented in Bela Balassa, The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning,
New Haven, 1959, especially pp. 110 if and 153 if.In the case of Poland, we find
Professor Oscar Lange, a well-known Polish economist, describing some aspects of
Polish industrial development through 1956 as follows (see "For a New Economic
Program," translated from the Polish in Zycie Gospodarcze, July 16, 1956, and reproduced
for private circulation by the Center for International Studies, October 1956, pp. 2 and 5)
• In industry, production of substandard or unusable goods (rejects) and wastage of
materials constitute a serious economic prciblem. At the beginning, it appeared mainly in
the field of consumer goods. The diminishing quality of consumer goods became a
serious phenomenon hampering the improvement of living conditions but it did not slow
down the production process. At present, production of unusable goods (rejects) has
extended to the mechanical industries, production of tools and transport equipment, etc.
This threatens to stop the technical processes of production as well as to disrupt the
production basis of the national economy. It also undermines the foundations of foreign
trade.
•. Itis necessary to stop the race for purely quantitative indices which are attained
thanks to low quality and high own costs. This brings about purely fictitious results, the
usage of raw materials and of human labour for production of goods which do not produce
the intended economic, and often even the intended technical effects (e.g., agricultural
machinery improper to any use after a few weeks)."
26E.Sokolova, "0 strukture toplivnogo balansa SSSR" [Breakdown of Fuel Produced
in the USSR], Voprosy ekonomiki [Problems of Economics], 1958, No. 5, p. 63.
27Thisindex is derived from data given on page 376. Data in Promyshlennost' SSSR
[Industry of the USSR], Moscow, 1957, pp. 133 and 140, imply no change in calorific
content between 1913 and 1955, but the implied content for 1913 is clearly too low (see
page 372).
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and potential octane ratings of derived fuels) ranges from 0.6 to 6.5 per
cent for petroleum from the Ural-Volga fields, as contrasted with 0.01 to
0.4 per cent for petroleum from the Caucasian fields. The share of the
Ural-Volga petroleum in total output rose from 6 per cent in 1940 to
29 per cent in 1950 and to 58 per cent in 1955, while the share of Caucasian
petroleum fell from 87 per cent in 1940 to 57 per cent in 1950 and to 30
per cent in 1955.28 The resulting loss in quality—it would be more
expensive to produce petroleum with a lower sulfur content—may have
been offset in part by an improvement in the geographical distribution
of crude petroleum relative to markets for it and its products, but effects
of this nature are difficult to assess.
Our remaining examples are generally in areas of lower priority.
Phosphoric fertilizers provide the first case. Output is stated tã be meas-
ured in terms of superphosphate of a given average content of phosphoric
acid, and recent sources give a breakdown into superphosphates and
ground natural phosphate.Aside from being less soluble than super-
phosphate, ground natural phosphate can be produced much more
cheaply, since it is not processed beyond the grinding of phosphate rock.
Ground natural phosphate accounted (in tonnage) for about 15 per cent
of all the phosphoric fertilizers produced in 1913, for 10 per cent in 1928,
for 45 per cent in 1932, for 30 per cent in 1937, for 17 per cent in 1950,
and for 19 per cent in 1955. We note that the quality of phosphoric
fertilizers has fluctuated sharply over various spans of years, with a trend
toward worsening over the entire Soviet period.29
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the term "bricks" is used in
Soviet statistics to cover several things in addition to kilned clay bricks.
Apparently, all types of brick-like and block-like building materials are
included:bricks proper, silica bricks, sand-lime bricks, slag ("cinder")
bricks and blocks, concrete blocks, and so on—possibly even building
stone. Very little information is available on the composition of output
over long periods, but enough is known about sand-lime and slag bricks
to indicate that their share in total output has increased from 4 per cent
in 1913 to 14 per cent in 1937 and to 17 per cent in 1955.Since these
bricks are less costly (and generally of lower structural quality) jhan kilned
bricks, there has probably been some worsening of the quality of "bricks"
as far as this factor is concerned.
28M.Brenner, "Problems of Oil in Long-Range Development of USSR National
Economy," Current Digest, X, 22, p. 5 (original text Voprosy ekonomiki, 1958, No. 2, pp.
16—29).
29Mineralfertilizers are typically transported and stored in bulk, with further losses in
quantity and quality.See, e.g., Current Digest, X, 3, p. 29.
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Glass presents an interesting example of how quality may be affected
by changing the physical unit of measure. Grossman traces the history
as follows :30
•.. Atone time a variety of units was employed, but in the early
thirties tonnage became the specified physical dimension in all branches
of the glass industry (window glass, bottles, flasks, tumblers).It was
chosen for easier production planning (i.e. the construction of input-
output ratios, capacity utilization rates,etc.)since both the raw
materials for glassmaking and the semifinished product, raw glass,
were measured by weight.It was, so to say, material-oriented. But
this led the plants to produce the thickest and heaviest sheet glass and
glassware, thus greatly contributing to the acute shortage of glass and
glassware generally at the time. (The production of thick window glass
was also stimulated by technical difficulties in mastering the new con-
tinuous sheet glassmaking process).Seen another way, the materials
for glassmaking, especially alkali, which were also very scarce, were
being used very ineffectively. The crisis finally led to a special resolu-
tion of SNK [Council of People's Commissars], dated April 2, 1934,
which imposed utility-oriented rather than material-oriented units
of measure: square meters for window glass, and number of pieces
for glassware.
As a result of the second change, glass apparently got thinner and thinner.
Flat glass now seems to average 2 millimeters in thickness.3'
Paradoxically, excessive thickening and thinning of flat glass both
amounted to worsening of quality from the point of view of cost, given the
optimum continuous sheet process. On the other hand, the supplanting
of less expensive "half-white" glass by more expensive "white" glass has
improved quality.The share of white glass rose from 23 per cent in
1928 to 67 per cent in 1950.
Because of the shortage of protein in the Soviet diet, continual stress
has been placed on expanding the fish catch and improving the quality of
fish products. Most of the growth in fish catch has taken place in the
postwar period, as a result of wartime acquisitions of rich fishing grounds
"GregoryGrossman, Soviet Statistics of Physical Output of Industrial Commodities:Their
Compilation and Quality, Princeton for NBER, 1960, p. 75.
SeeSte/do i keramika [Glass and Ceramics], 1955, No. 3, p. 25. The thinness of flat
glass, along with careless handling, accounts for the high breakage rate: 30 to 35 per cent
of the flat glass delivered to construction sites seems to be broken on arrival (see Grossman,
Soviet Statis€ics, p. 124).
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in the Baltic Sea and in the Pacific Ocean off Sakhalin Island. Even so,
the heavy subsidies given the industry moved Premier Bulganin to re-
mark that "every fish caught indeed becomes a 'goldfish.' "32 Moreover,
wastage and spoilage now account for around a third of the total catch,
compared with about a quarter in
Soviet authorities grant that progress in improving the quality of fish
products leaves much to be desired. Major emjthasis has been placed on
diminishing the share of salted fish and increasing the shares of fresh,
frozen, cured, and canned fish.As can be seen from Table 5, these
TABLE 5






1940 1950 1954 1955
Fresh and frozenfish 22 33 29 27 32 38
Salted fish 70 62 56 62 62 57
Smoked, pickled, cured,
and canned fish 8 6 15 11 6 5
SOURcE: Za sotsialisticheskoerybnoe k/zoziaisivo [Fora Socialist Fishing Industry], 1931,
No. 6, p. 30;Socialist Construction in the USSR, Moscow, 1936, p. 219; Rybnoe khoziaislvo
[The Fishing Industry], September 1940, p. 17;and Planovoe khoziaistvo [Planned
Economy], 1956, No. 1, pp. 84 f.Output measured in metric tons.
efforts were successful during the period from 1929 through 1940, though
it is doubtful that this represents an improvement over conditions in the
pre-Plan period. In any event, the product mix in 1954 and 1955 was
similar to the mix in 1932.Salted fish still accounted for considerably
more than half of all fish products, and cured and canned fish for less
than 6 per cent. The preponderance of salted fish does not mean that
Russian tastes run in that direction, as can be seen from the continual
efforts to supplant salting by other preservative methods. Salting seems
to persist in crude form (grubye posol') because it is less expensive than
canning, curing, or refrigerating.
Soap, technically defined, is a fatty acid.In the prerevolutionary
period, the fatty acid content of manufactured soap ran about 85 per
cent on the average, or about the same as for manufactured soap in the
United States. During the First Five Year Plan, fatty acids were increas-
ingly displaced by cheaper "fillers," and the average content dropped to
32Bulganin,"Tasks," p. 13.
"SeeSovetskaiatorgovlia [SovietTrade], 1956, No. 7, p. 6.See also the letter to the
editor in Pravda,February17, 1957 (translated in CurrentDigest, IX,7,p.41).
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a low point of about 40 per cent in 1930, rising thereafter to around
50 per cent in 1936. Changes in quality have not been reported during
the postwar period, and the silence suggests that the fatty acid content has
not been rising. In data on output, the loss in quality is taken into account
by recording production in terms of a standard (40 per cent) fatty acid
content.
Sugar in the Soviet Union is produced in two forms:as crystals and
as lumps.In Soviet statistics, sugar crystals are referred to as "sand"
(pesok) sugar, and sugar lumps as "refined" (rafinad) sugar."Sand"
sugar is essentially a semiprocessed crystallized sugar, whereas "refined"
sugar is made by fusing "sand" sugar and cutting it into lumps. During
the prerevolutionary period, more than 60 per cent of the "sand" sugar
was "refined." This fraction fell to a iow point of 14 per cent in 1930,
rising thereafter to a peak of 43 per cent in 1937,andfalling and rising
once again in succeeding years to reach a level of 36 per cent in 1955.
Over the entire Soviet period, the of sugar has therefore worsened
in this respect: less than 40 per cent of the "sand" sugar is now processed
into lump form, compared with more than 60 per cent before the
revolution.
As we noted in the preceding chapter, in Soviet usage the meaning
of "canned food" is much broader than in Tsarist and Western usage,
where it is restricted to food packed in hermetically sealed containers.
In Soviet statistics the term applies to many types of preserved foods,
packed in bulk (e.g., pickles in the barrel) as well as in hermetically
sealed containers. Data on the breakdown by hermetically sealed and
bulk-packed products are meager, existing only for the Second Five
Year Plan. According to figures published at that time, hermetically
sealed products accounted for 37 per cent of canned food in 1933, 32
per cent in 1.934, 43 per cent in 1935, and 48 per cent in Since
the data on total output of canned food in those years were apparently
revised in 1956 to exclude some bulk products, the percentages would
now be somewhat higher. In any case, canned food as given in Soviet
statistics for 1913 was all hermetically sealed. Hence the product mix
was downgraded between 1913 and 1934, from which low point there
was a slight improvement up to 1937. To put it another way, according
to Soviet data, output of preserved food multiplied about ten times be-
tween 1913 and 1937; at the same time, output of hermetically sealed
products multiplied only about seven times.Changes in the product
"SocialistConstruction, 1936, p. 219, and Narodno-khoziaistvennyi plan na 1937 god [The
National Economic Plan for 1937], Moscow, 1937, p. 102.
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mix since 1937 are not known well enough to be able to say what has
happened to the percentage of hermetically sealed products.
The types of preserved food have changed during the Soviet period.
In 1913, 80 per cent of output was accounted for by meat, meat and
vegetables, and fish, the remainder being vegetables. Since 1932, 40 per
cent or less has been accounted for by the former category, while the
variety of other products has apparently expanded to include fruits,
evaporated milk, and juices.35 Tomatoes have typically accounted for a
large share, as large or larger than all other vegetables combined.
It should, incidentally, be noted that Soviet food products are still
distributed overwhelmingly in bulk, at least as far as the normal household
is concerned. Very little progress has been made in packaging, a develop-
ment that has added substantially to the cost of food processing in the
West. The percentages of marketed output bottled or packaged for
household use were as follows in 1952:butter, 2.7;vegetable oil, 2;
margarine, 30;confectionery, 20; lump sugar, 8; jam, 9.4;salt, 13;
beer, 27.5; and macaroni, 3.4. The percentages in 1955 were: butter,
6.4; vegetable oil, 4.5; lump sugar, 12.3; macaroni, 3.2; meat, 2.1;
and milk, 9.6.In 1952, more than 80 per cent of the plum jelly was
"canned" in lOO-liter (26-gallon) barrels, and more than 37 per cent of
the other types ofjelly in barrels half as large or of equal size. Yeast was
put up in packages of 100 grams (3.5 ounces) or more. Lard and othei
edible fats were not packaged at all, even though they had been packed
in boxes and jars before the war.36
The leather footwear produced in prerevolutionary Russia was com-
parable with, and in some cases superior to, Western footwear. The low
quality of present day Soviet footwear has already been described. This
deterioration in quality has resulted in part from mechanization, but more
importantly from troubles in the leather industry that have persisted
since collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930's. The output of
hard leather fell by 65 per cent between 1928 and while the output
of boots and shoes did not fall at all. In the same period, employment in
industries producing leather substitutes multiplied about four times.
The output of hard leather had not recovered to its 1928 level by as late
as 1955, while the output of boots and shoes had multiplied about 2.7
See Promyshlennost', 1957, p. 399.
F. Dubinin in Sovetskaia torgovlia, 1953, No. 7, p. 6; and I. K. Sivolap and A. S.
Shatkan, Pishchevaia promyshlennost' SSSR [The USSR Food Industry], Moscow, 1957,
p. 27.
The quality of tanned leather also worsened in these and succeeding years (see, e.g.,
Grossman, Soviet Statistics, p. 76).
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times. By 1940, about 70 per cent of the footwear produced in large-scale
industry was made at least in part from leather substitutes;around
10 per cent of all footwear was made out of reclaimed materials, re-
covered from scraps or wornout shoes. Despite substantial downgrading
of standards, between 30 and 40 per cent of the footwear produced in
recent years has been substandard.
The cotton textile industry of prerevolutionary Russia was closely
related to the British textile industry, because both were based on long-
staple Egyptian cotton and because British firms dominated the Russian
industry. Use of Egyptian cotton made possible the spinning of fine yarn:
in 1913 Russian yarn had an average number of around 52, which is to
say that the average length of a gram of yarn was about 52 meters.38
By way of comparison, the average number has been as high as 51 for
British yarn in recent years and around 38 for American yarn (which is
spun from a shorter-staple cotton).Hence, prerevolutionary Russian
yarn was about as fine on the average as British yarn of recent years,
and considerably finer than American yarn.
The fine yarn was utilized to make closely woven cloth, that is, cloth
with a high thread count. Thus, in 1913 the average thread count of
Russian cotton cloth was apparently around 90.5 threads a square centi-
meter, or 230 threads a square inch. This is about the same as the thread
count for British cloth, which in recent years has averaged between 200
and 250 a square inch.It is considerably higher than the recent counts
for American cloth, which have averaged between 150 and 175. Manu-
facturing cost is higher for high-count than for low-count cloth.
During the Soviet period the quality of cloth has worsened as measured
by these two characteristics:fineness of yarn and closeness of weave.
No evidence is available on other important characteristics, such as
tensile strength of yarn. The known deterioration in quality is shown in
Table 6, which presents indexes of average yarn number and average
thread count on 1913 as a base. The yarn number declined steadily—
the yarn became steadily coarser—during the interwar period, dipped
to a low point during World War II, and recovered to approximately the
prewar level by 1955, the last year for which the number could be derived.
The average yarn number in 1940 and 1955 was around 39, or about the
same as for the United States in recent years. Therefore, as far as fineness
of yarn is concerned, the Soviet cotton textile industry has moved away
from the British standard toward the American one.
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SouRcE: Appendix A, technical note 1.
The thread count reached its iow point in 1933, rose thereafter up to
World War II, fell during the war, recovered the prewar level about
1950, and rose thereafter to reach a level in 1955 slightly lower than in
1928. At its low point the thread count averaged less than 160 a square
inch, and in 1955 it averaged around 185. Hence in this respect, too,
the Soviet cotton textile industry has left the British model and approached
the American one.
It is of interest that the yarn number has declined more percentagewise
than the thread count, so that the weight of a square meter of cloth has
increased during the Soviet period. This is merely to say that, as far as
weight is concerned, the decline in thread count has been more than
offset by the increase in coarseness of yarn. Soviet writers sometimes refer
to the increasing density of cloth as evidence of improved quality, whereas
in fact it is the consequence of lower quality in the two dimensions
usually considered relevant.
Simplification and standardization has accompanied lower quality.
In the prerevolutionary period, the Russian textile industry produced
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about 1,300 types (constructions) of cloth;the number was reduced to
260 in 1929/30.In recent years the number has risen to around 500,
but 4 of these apparently account for 54 per cent of total output and 70
for 77 per cent.
In the prerevolutionary period, Russia was the fourth largest producer
of silk and synthetic fabrics in the world. The fabrics were predominantly
silk and silk mixtures; silk accounted for 93 per cent of the fibers used in
weight. In succeeding years rayon became increasingly important: by
1955, rayon accounted for 90 per cent of the fibers used, while silk
accounted for only 3 per cent. The remaining 7 per cent was accounted
for by other synthetic fibers—mainly kapron, a fiber similar to nylon.39
Even though Soviet statistics still refer to the industry as "silk fabrics,"
it now produces essentially rayon fabrics. Whether this should be called
a lowering of quality is open to question. From the point of view of
fabricating cost, more expensive fabrics have been relatively displaced,
and in this sense there has been a loss in quality. But a similar displace-
ment, not so pronounced, has taken place in the United States, for ex-
ample. On another aspect of quality, Soviet fabrics have become highly
standardized:in 1925/26, almost 500 different types of fabric were
produced; by 1927/28, the last year for which data are available, the
number had been reduced to less than 200.40
The quality of woolen and worsted fabrics has certainly deteriorated
over the Soviet period, mostly during the early 1930's.This is shown
first of all by changes in the product mix. For instance, the fraction of
output accounted for by all-wool fabrics fell from 50 per cent in 1930
(which was already well below the average for prerevolutionary Russia)
to 14 per cent in 1933. As to the wool cottonized fiber and shoddy
came to be increasingly important at the expense of virgin wool. From
1928 through 1931 the share of virgin wool in the weight of fine woolen
fabrics fell from 43 to 20 per cent; in coarse woolen fabrics, from 67 to
48 per cent.
A different type of evidence indicates that the lower quality has
persisted, though some recovery has been made from the nadir of the
mid-l930's. Table 7 shows a percentage breakdown of part-wool and
"Promyshlennost',1957, p. 323, and Voprosy ekonomiki, 1956, No. 7, p. 58. There may
have been a large increase in the output of silk fabrics around 1952, possibly as a result of
a sudden and substantial increase in the imports of raw silk from China. This possible
sharp spurt in the production of silk fabrics has proved temporary, and rayon has become
once again the dominant raw material of this industry.
Izvestiatekstil'noi promyshlennosti i torgovli [News of the Textile Industry and Trade],
1929, No. 2, p. 11.
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TABLE 7
COMPOSITION OF SOVIET WOOLEN AND WORSTED FABRICS, SELECTED YEARS
(per cent)
Percentage of Total Output
Fine Coarse
Worsteds Woolens Woolens
1913a 54 20 26
1926a 54 25 21
41 34 25
14 47 38
1937 25 37 38
1940 29 39 32
1950b 40 38 22
1955b 40 43 17
SOURCE:Statistical Abstract of Industrial Output in the Soviet Union, Part 4, series 12 16. 1;
Promyshlennost', 1957, p. 330. Output measured in meters.
Large-scale production only.
bMinisterialproduction only. For 1940, the percentages for ministerial output were
30, 43, and 27.
all-wool fabrics into worsteds, fine woolens, and coarse woolens. The
share of worsteds fell from 54 per cent in 1913 and 1926 to a low of 14
per cent in 1932, rising thereafter to 29 per cent in 1940 and to 40 per
cent in 1955. At the other extreme, the share of coarse woolens rose in
the interwar period, though it has fallen in the postwar period apparently
below the 1913 level. The share of fine woolens has risen more than the
share of coarse woolens, but there is doubt that the distinction between
coarse and fine woolens has the same meaning now as in the prerevolution-
ary period. Almost all fabrics are mixtures of wool and cotton or wool
and rayon, though it is difficult to know how important the other fibers
have been in recent years. Almost all fabrics were all-wool in 1913; the
fraction fell to 50 per cent in 1930, 5 per cent in 1940 and 1950, and 9 per
cent in 1955.41 The average width of fabrics also declined between 1940
and 1955.42
Notes on Product Mix
The purpose of this concluding section is to describe the product mix of
some industrial sectors and compare it with the typical mix to be found
in Western economies, especially the United States.Historical develop-
ments will not be so much at issue as the character of Soviet industry in
recent years relative to conditions in other countries. Some discussion of
41Zarekonstruktsiiu tekstil'noi pronzyshlennosti [For the Reconstruction of the Textile
Industry], 1933, No. 12, p. 4; and Promyshlennost', 1957,p.330.
42Grossman,Soviet Statistics, p. 121.
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this question is needed to provide a background for estimates of compara-
tive levels of industrial production, such as we shall make later for the
Soviet Union and the United States (see Chapter 8).
In general, Soviet industrial products are more simplified and standard-
ized than in the West, even in the more favored sectors of industry.
The Soviet mix of rolled steel products is more limited in variety than the
mix found in most Western countries, and the same is true for most
machinery, as we shall see.In addition, the quality of a number of
narrowly defined products falls short of Western standards.In some
areas, such as military production, Soviet products undoubtedly match or
excel their Western counterparts, but we are unable to comment further
on these for lack of details. Once again we are plagued by paucity of
information, and the examples we cite are simply those about which
something is known.
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS
We pointed out that lignite now accounts for around 29 per cent of
Soviet coal; in the United States, it accounts for less than 1 per cent.
The quality of Soviet crude petroleum, as indicated by sulfur content and
similar technical standards, is on the average also lower than in the
United States, the petroleum of comparable quality from the Caucasus,
Sakhalin, and the Emba District being outweighed by lower-grade
petroleum from the Ural-Volga region.
Raw steel seems to be up to Western standards in the alloys and
specifications produced, but the range of products is much more limited.
The case is similar for rolled products. From the recurring complaints
about steel castings and about copper and brass products, one would
assume that they are generally of lower quality than in the West. The
established standards for aluminum are, on the other hand, comparable
to those in the West, and there is no evidence to indicate that they are
not generally observed.
We have seen that Soviet glass is very thin, averaging about 2 milli-
meters in thickness.Plate and other polished glass apparently accounts
for less than 2 per cent of the output in square meters, in conventional
units of 2-millimeter thickness.43 By contrast, plate and other polished
glass accounted in 1954 for over 60 per cent of the value and approximately
40 per cent of the square footage (unadjusted for differences in thickness)
of all flat glass produced in the United States.44 Not counting plate
The planned percentage for 1956 was 1.7 (Sleklo i keramika, 1955, No. 3, p. 25).
"Census of United States Manufactures: 1954, Washington, 1957, Vol. II, Pt. 2, pp.
32A-9 and 32A-12. Laminated glass is excluded from these calculations to avoid double
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and other polished glass, the average thickness of window glass in the
United States was around 2.7 millimeters in
Electricity would seem to be homogeneous, but there are important
differences between the Soviet and Western products. Throughout the
Soviet period, generating capacity has never managed to keep up with
the consumption desired at established prices; that is to say, consumption
is not rationed by price. Instead, there is a system of priorities governing
decisions on whose electricity is to be shut off when consumption threatens
to exceed generating capacity.It is not unusual to have the supply of
electricity to households and such things as street lighting, even in large
cities, cut off without warning. During the middle 1930's, the same thing
applied to whole sectors of industry. Another method of rationing is to
reduce the current. The allowable variations in frequency and voltage
of current are considerably higher on the average than in the United
States, but the standards are more rigorous than in the United States in
the case of defense industries, where virtually no variations in current
are allowed.46
MACHINERY
Soviet motor vehicles are highly standardized. About a dozen models of
automobiles have been produced in quantity in the Soviet Union. Half
of these were introduced in the interwar period and half in the postwar
period, almost all being copied from American prototypes. An American
automobile company produces more basic models in a year than the
Soviet Union has produced to date. Production is even more standardized
in the case of trucks, where the two-and-a-half-ton model predominates.47
Similarly, it has been Soviet policy to keep a simple structure of basic
railroad equipment. Steam locomotives have been the primary source
of power, and only six types have been produced in quantity: three for
counting. Square footage of plate glass is not given directly and has been estimated by
dividing the value per unit of industrially consumed plate glass (derived from data on
p. 32A-12) into total value of shipments of plate glass (given on p. 32A—9).
Derived from data in ibid., p. 32A-9. The thickness of different types of window glass
was taken as follows:thin, mm.; single strength, 2.31 mm.; double strength,
3.18 mm.; and heavy sheet, 4.5 mm.
46Thisparagraph is based on John Pearce Hardt, "Economics of the Soviet Electric
Power Industry" (processed), Research Studies Institute, Air University, Alabama, 1955,
pp. 84 if, 314 if, and 326 if.It is interesting to note that the average Soviet load factor was
10 per cent lower than the U.S. factor in 1955 (derived from data in A Report on USSR
Electric Power Developments, 1958-1959, pp. 74 and 76), indicating less effective use of
capacity.
This paragraph is based onMashinostroenie [Machine Building], Moscow, 1947,
Vol. II, pp. 264 if; Eksportno-importnyi slovar' [Export-Import Dictionary], Moscow, 1952,
Vol. I, pp. 70 if;and A. A. Kurov, Automobil' [Motor Vehicles), Moscow, 1938,
p. 18.
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freight service and three for passenger service. There has, however, been
a significant shift in production toward electric and diesel locomotives in
the postwar period. Passenger cars are simple and standard.48
Agricultural equipment has also been highly standardized. We shall
concentrate discussion here on tractors, since considerable information
is available on the product mix. During the entire Soviet period, sixteen
basic models of regular tractors and one type of garden tractor have
been produced.This may be compared with eighteen basic models
produced in the United States in 1953 by International Harvester alone.
Track-laying crawlers have been favored over wheeled tractors, though
both types have been produced at all times. In 1955, crawlers accounted
for more than three-quarters of the drawbar capacity of all tractors in
use in Soviet agriculture. During the 1920's and early 1930's, there were
two basic tractor models produced; during the middle and late 1930's,
there were three;and during the 1950's, there were six or seven.49
The Soviet press has contained frequent complaints that tractors (and
other agricultural equipment) are too highly standardized and, as a
result, poorly adapted to many agricultural conditions.5°
Soviet tractors are mainly copies of American models. On this score,
it may be useful to quote what Professor Norton T. Dodge has to say in
his comprehensive study of the Soviet tractor industry :51
Despitethe great improvement in the variety of types of tractors
produced by the Soviet tractor industry, the models in production
still lag behind American models from a technological point of view.
The Soviet Union began with the production of obsolete models,
and has not yet completely caught up with developments abroad.
Although the Soviet Union made every effort to obtain the latest and
best equipment for the factories producing tractors, the tractor models
produced were chosen primarily because of their reliability, durability,
and proven performance over a period of years. In view of the rough
usage to which tractors were subjected under Russian conditions, such
considerations were of particular importance. On the other hand, the
48CurrentDigest, IX, 39, pp. 24 f.
These data are drawn from Norton T. Dodge, "The Tractor Industry of the USSR"
(mimeographed), Washington, Council for Economic and Industry Research, 1955,
pp. 23 if;Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR [National Economy of the USSR], Moscow, 1956,
p. 144; and A. M. Kiriukhin, Trakiory shestoi piatiletki [Tractors of the Sixth Five Year
Plan], Moscow, 1956, p. 36.
See, e.g., the letter from four collective farm chairmen in Pravda, February 25, 1957
(translated in Current Digest, IX, 8, p. 45).
51Dodge,"Tractor Industry," pp. 26 if.
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reliance upon proven foreign models has led to the equipping of Russian
agriculture with tractors already rendered obsolete by newer develop-
ments abroad.
For example, the Fordson was first produced in this country in
1915, and by the latter half of the 'twenties was already being super-
seded by newer, more versatile types.In 1928, the year the Russians
began to increase Fordson capacity at the Putilov Plant severalfold,
Ford shut down his Dearborn plant and ceased production of the
Fordson in America.
Production of the International 15/30 began in this country in 1921,
and was discontinued at the Milwaukee Plant of International Har-
vester in 1931, the year mass production of the Russian version of the
International began. International Harvester introduced the Farmall
in 1923. Ten years later, just as International Harvester was introduc-
ing an improved model, production of the Soviet version began at the
Krasnyi Putilovets Plant which converted from the production of the
Fordson to production of the Universal. Finally, in 1955, a modernized
diesel version of the Universal is in the developmental stage. Until the
present there has been no change in the basic design.
Caterpillar discontinued production of the 60 model crawler, which
had been produced since 1925, in 1930. The Soviet copy was first
produced in quantity in 1933, two years after the Caterpillar Diesel
had come out. The Soviet version of the Diesel was in production by
1937. Two years earlier, Caterpillar began the production of an
improved model, the D-7.Production of the Soviet version was
delayed by the war, but in 1946 the first Stalinets-80 was produced.
The ancestry of the SKHTZ-NATI and more recent postwar models
is more difficult to trace, but all have borrowed heavily on foreign
design and technology. The power lift, for example, came into general
use in this country in the 'thirties, and the hydraulic lift was introduced
in 1940. Production of the hydraulic lift in the Soviet Union did not
begin until 1950.Rubber tires were introduced in this country in
1932, and became standard equipment within a few years. No Soviet
tractors were equipped with rubber tires, except industrial and towing
tractors, until 1950. Only one model, the Universal-4, which is used
for cotton pickers, has rubber tires as equipment.The
MTZ-1 and 2 and the KHTZ may be so equipped, but reports indicate
that rubber plants are failing to meet their commitments.
Aluminum alloy sleeve bearings were introduced in this country
around 1940. They are still being tested in the Soviet Union. Power
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steering, oil clutches, automatic hitching, etc., are yet to be incorporated
on Soviet tractors. Nevertheless, the Soviets are making rapid improve-
ments in design, and the most archaic models and features will soon be
eliminated, according to official pronouncements.
As for machinery other than transportation and agricultural equip-
ment, quality and complexity have undoubtedly improved markedly
over the Soviet period. At the same time, it is important to recognize
that the general practice is to produce a limited number of standardized
models.Models are changed infrequently, and machines are seldom
custom-built. The user adapts to the machine, not the machine to the
user.Complex machines are often constructed by combining several
standardized machines. For example, a so-called "aggregate" machine
tool, which is designed for automatic or semi-automatic fabrication of a
particular item, is generally made out of standard lathes, milling ma-
chines, and so on, put together on a unified mount.
Since Bulganin's speech referred to above, there has been a rather
steady campaign to stimulate innovation and modernization in machinery
industries.For instance, in an article in Izvestia, December 3, 1957, a
Soviet professor, A. Rybkin, states in part:52
Our country has an enormous stock of metalworking machine tools;
the number of machine tools in the Soviet Union surpasses the number
in all European countries. However, more than 40% of our machine
tools are of simple design.It is quite clear that we must alter this
percentage and make more highly productive machine tools instead of
simple types, and also make more up-to-date automatic and semi-
automatic machine tools. .
Newbearing materials are necessary because of the great increase
in the operating speeds of machinery. Incidentally, this increase has
taken place not only in aviation and reaction technology but in
machines used in common industrial processes that operate under high
pressure or temperature.Bearings made of the types of steel now
employed no longer satisfy growing demands.Consequently itis
necessary to make heat-resistant steels or alloys for roller bearings that
can provide normal operating conditions for machines operating under
high temperatures or pressures.
In his report on industrial organization presented to the Supreme
Soviet in May 1957, Khrushchev notes that an automobile plant built in
52CurrentDigest, IX, 48, p. 24.
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Communist China with Soviet assistance is technically superior to similar
plants in the Soviet Union. He then goes on to remark:53
The question arises: Could we, while supplying our Chinese friends
with modern equipment, have re-equipped our own auto plants at the
same time? We undoubtedly could have, but this was not done
because we have the incorrect practice of planning machine-tool output
without direct responsibility. As a result, plants produce large quanti-
ties of all-purpose, low-output and often obsolete equipment, which is
not always needed by industry.Here are the figures.In 1956 our
industry produced a total of 121,000 metal-cutting machine tools but
less than 22,000 specialized and multiple-unit machine tools, or 18%
of the total output.Therefore, with comprehensive planning of the
production of equipment and an increase in the output of specialized
machine tools, in the course of one year one could re-equip not only
the Gorky and Moscow Auto Plants but some other enterprises as
well, without failingto.. meet obligations for deliveries to foreign
countries. The equipment removed from the plants as obsolete could
be used for repair shops and other auxiliary services in our industry.
At the moment, new machine tools are being allocated for this purpose
as well as for new production.
CONSUMER GOODS
We noted above that salted fish account for around 60 per cent of Soviet
fish products, fresh and frozen fish for 30 to 40 per cent, and cured and
canned fish for around 5 per cent. By way of contrast, fish products in
the United States (exclusive of wastage, by-products, bait, etc.) were
divided as follows over the period 1950—1955:fresh and frozen fish,
around 55 per cent; canned fish, around 42 per cent; and cured fish,
around 3 per cent. The output of salted fish was negligible.54
Almost all Soviet soap is produced in bar or "hard" form. In 1937,
hard soap accounted for 94 per cent of output; and in 1954, for 93 per
cent. In the United States, the comparable fractions were 56 per cent in
1937 and 20 per cent in The spectacular growth of detergents in
the United States and other Western countries has had no counterpart in
the Soviet Union.
Ibid., IX, 18, p. 12 (original text in Pravda and Izvestia, May 8, 1957).
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1958, Washington, 1958, p. 708.
P. Serebrennikov, "0 prekrashchenii raskhoda pishchevogo syr'ia na tekhnicheskie
tseli" [On Stopping the Use of Edible Raw Materials for Technical Purposes], Voprosy
ekonomiki, 1956, No. 10, p. 32.
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Two final remarks may be made about processed foods.First, the
Soviet "sand" sugar is produced in the form of crystals, not as highly
processed as the granulated sugar of the West. Second, as we have noted,
food processing does not generally extend to the packaging stage in the
Soviet Union—not even to the bottling of milk—whereas packaged
foods have become the rulein the West, particularly the United
States.
In cotton textiles, Soviet fabrics are similar to American ones in average
yarn number and thread count, but the variety of goods is much more
limited and production is concentrated in lower-grade fabrics.About
150 yarn numbers are now produced in the United States, with 30 to 40
accounting for 95 per cent of output; only 68 yarn numbers are now
produced in the Soviet Union, with 15 accounting for 95 per cent of the
output. About 2,500 constructions of gray goods are produced regularly
in the United States—at least 4,000 from time to time; the number in
the Soviet Union is now around 500, with 4 accounting for 54 per cent
of the output. Dyeing and finishing of Soviet fabrics fall far below general
Western standards, since cheap sulfur dyes are used predominantly.
Soviet output of cotton fabrics in linear measure covers narrow-woven as
well as broad-woven goods, while American output covers broad-woven
goods (those over 12 inches in width) only. The average width of broad-
woven fabrics is around 69 centimeters in the Soviet Union and around
100 centimeters in the United States.56 Both these factors must be kept
in mind when comparing output in the two countries, since it is ordinarily
expressed in linear, not square, measure.
In the case of silk and synthetic fabrics, rayon is now the dominant
fiber in both the Soviet Union and the United States, but there is a
difference in its importance in the two countries. In the United States,
it accounted for 76 per cent of the combined textile mill consumption of
silk, synthetic fibers (nylon, dacron, etc.), and rayon in in the
Soviet Union, for 90 per cent. Synthetic fibers accounted for 23 per cent
in the United States, compared with 7 per cent in the Soviet Union;
and silk for 1 per cent, compared with 3 per cent. American fabrics are
about 20 per cent wider on the average than Soviet fabrics.58 The
variety of Soviet silk and synthetic fabrics is considerably more limited
56Theseremarks are based on data in Appendix A, technical note 1.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1958, p. 800.
Soviet fabrics vary from 80 to 106 centimeters in width (Tovarovedenie
tovarov [Commercial Specifications of Industrial Goods], Moscow, 1954, Vol. II, p. 124)
while U.S. fabrics average about 112 centimeters according to data in the Census of
United States Manufactures: 1947.
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than in Western countries, and dyeing and finishing, as in the case of
cotton fabrics, is of lower quality.
It is difficult to compare woolen fabrics for the Soviet Union and the
United States because of inadequate data on relevant characteristics.
American data are no longer compiled for all-wool and part-wool
fabrics, but all-wool fabrics accounted for 72 per cent of output in 1929
and for at least 59 per cent in In the postwar years, blends with
synthetic fibers have become more popular, and the fraction has probably
fallen. However, it is certainly higher than the 5 to 9 per cent recorded
in recent years in the Soviet Union. Soviet blends are predominantly with
cotton and rayon; in the United States, with nylon, dacron, and orion.
Up to 1951, only fabrics with 25 per cent or more wool were counted as
woolen in American statistics; since 1951, only fabrics with 50 per cent
or more. We do not know the comparable standards for the Soviet
Union. Coarse woolens have accounted for no more than 14 per cent of
output in recent years in the United States,6° compared with 1 7 per cent
and more in the Soviet Union.Soviet fabrics average around 128
centimeters in width,61 while American fabrics average around 150
centimeters.
Finally, in the case of consumer durables products tend to correspond
with standard, "stripped down" models of the West—they are sometimes
direct copies. Mechanization has been slow in some areas. Household
sewing machines, for example, are almost all foot-pedal models.
Concluding Remarks
This less than adequate look at the qualitative aspects of Soviet industrial
production, hampered by the selective nature of Soviet statistics, can
be summarized only in broad terms. In general, industrial products are
less complex and varied in the Soviet Union than in the West, and they
have improved in quality more slowly. The picture is, however, one of
contrasts between the favored sector of the three "M's"—metallurgy,
machinery, and munitions—and the neglected sector of the three "C's"—
consumer goods, construction materials, and chemicals.In between
these extremes lies a number of industries that have experienced mixed
qualitative developments.Finally, Soviet industry has been subject to
"cyclical swings" in the quality of production, coinciding with swings in
the rate of growth of industrial output. When the growth rate slows
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1938, Washington, 1938, p. 784.
°°StatisticalAbstract of the United States, 1956, Washington, 1956, p. 816.
Grossman,Soviet Statistics, p. 121.
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down, quality begins to deteriorate; when it speeds up, quality also tends
to improve. The mounting attention being paid in recent years to formerly
neglected sectors suggests that this characteristic pattern of qualitative
changes, both short- and long-run, may be undergoing transformation.
But that is for the future to say.
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